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Abstract: Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are praised as innovative policy 
instruments and they influence the governance of forest restoration efforts in two major 
ways. The first is the establishment of multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediary bodies 
between funders and planters to manage the funds and to distribute incentives to planters. 
The second implication is that specific contracts assign objectives to land users in the form 
of conditions for payments that are believed to increase the chances for sustained impacts 
on the ground. These implications are important in the assessment of the potential of PES 
to operate as new and effective funding schemes for forest restoration. They are analyzed 
by looking at two prominent payments for watershed service programs in Indonesia—
Cidanau (Banten province in Java) and West Lombok (Eastern Indonesia)—with combined 
economic and political science approaches. We derive lessons for the governance of 
funding efforts (e.g., multi-stakeholder agencies are not a guarantee of success; mixed 
results are obtained from a reliance on mandatory funding with ad hoc regulations, as 
opposed to voluntary contributions by the service beneficiary) and for the governance of 
financial expenditure (e.g., absolute need for evaluation procedures for the internal 
governance of farmer groups). Furthermore, we observe that these governance features 
provide no guarantee that restoration plots with the highest relevance for ecosystem 
services are targeted by the PES. 
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1. Introduction 
This article studies the implications of innovative funding instruments for forest restoration, 
acknowledging that an increasing proportion of lands are degraded in the tropics [1] and that private 
and market-oriented approaches are acknowledged for their potential ability to address environmental 
issues [2]. Admittedly, a number of economic approaches for natural resource management as a whole 
have been in existence for a long time (e.g., with incentives provided through fiscal policies, see [3] for 
an ambitious analysis that embraces a multitude of instruments), and land degradation is not a new 
phenomenon. However, the scale has changed dramatically and effective policies are today required 
more than ever. The search for these policies for forest and land management is influenced by a 
pervasive context of discourses presenting environmental services [4] as the way forward [5]. Thus, 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES), a direct application of the latter concept combined with 
market-oriented approaches, became the subject of many experiments [6] and the center of attention of 
scientists, practitioners and policy-makers. It essentially involves voluntary payments by the 
beneficiaries of a service to its providers, so long as pre-agreed conditions are met, hence relying on 
individual incentives to account for externalities in land-use decisions. 
There are many ways to study their implications for forest restoration [7], e.g., effectiveness [8,9], 
equity [10,11], sustainability of funding [12] or even the risks of disappearing intrinsic motivations for 
the preservation of nature [13,14], to single out only a few examples among a rapidly growing 
literature. In this article, we are interested in the implications specifically related to governance [15], 
which is the focus of this special issue. Governance refers here to the number, nature and interactions 
of the stakeholders that are involved in the programs, and to the institutional arrangements that are put 
in place for funding and spending among land users. It is therefore as much a matter of participation 
and local politics as it is a matter of technical arrangements to make sure that funding is sustained and 
spending leads to effective outcomes for land management. 
Previous research has emphasized the risks and challenges of forest restoration in Asia-Pacific 
when based on large-scale governmental programs [16]. Taking a political economy approach, the 
authors identified a number of governance challenges that might impede an effective implementation 
of forest restoration initiatives. Among these they cite the control of state agencies and the political 
connections of the main corporate actors, the existence of corruption practices and ultimately the risk 
that reforestation activities prioritize lands with natural forest cover (and hence forest conversion 
before reforestation). They conclude that ―tree-planting programs have been guided by forest rent 
distribution practices of state forest bureaucracies and by corporate accumulation strategies‖ (p. 9). 
We add to this analysis by looking at reforestation and forest restoration efforts from a different 
angle, with a focus on small-scale and privately-funded experiments based on the PES rationale. The 
latter payment schemes are indeed presented by some as particularly effective when applied to 
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restoration purposes [17,18]. On the one hand, PES schemes are reported to enable investors and 
practitioners to face high up-front capital needs and labor costs associated with tree plantations [19]. 
On the other hand, these schemes are assumed to provide farmers with technical assistance and 
economic incentives, which guarantee local participation in reforestation activities over time [20] and 
orient farmers’ behavior towards forest restoration [19]. Besides, it is contended that PES will also be a 
critical new source of funding generated by public and private demand for ecosystem services [21] so 
as to financially support restoration activities [22,23]. 
Our study is a contribution to this debate about the compared merits of ―traditional‖ vs. 
―innovative‖ approaches to forest restoration, from a governance perspective. It starts from the 
assumption that innovative instruments might provide better solutions for addressing the risks of 
embezzlement or corruption, as opposed to public programs, especially when the latter involve  
rent-seeking industrial corporate actors, as suggested by [16]. The distinction between these broad 
categories is somehow artificial and may not always be reflected by practice, but it still provides us 
with a starting point to conduct an investigation into the impacts that we can reasonably expect from 
any attempts to innovate funding and incentives in this domain. 
The primary intent of our analysis is to answer the research question: ―Do PES improve the 
governance of forest restoration programs as a basis for sustainable outcomes on the ground?‖. To 
investigate the impacts and added value of PES programs, we study the characteristics of their 
governance. This research question is addressed through the analysis of two assumptions: first, that a 
defining feature of PES compared to public programs is the key role given to multi-stakeholder 
agencies in terms of fund management, which is important from a governance perspective and creates 
the conditions for all views to be expressed including those of environmental NGOs and local 
residents; and second, that another crucial PES feature is the specific contracts that involve land users 
and assign objectives to them in the form of conditions for payments. These specific contracts result 
from service beneficiaries being attentive to effective service provision due to their direct, if not vital, 
interest in success, and they might provide more guarantees for sustained impacts on the ground. 
A major problem for this analysis is the confusion around the term PES itself, and the diversity of 
understandings and experiments that the term encompasses. This ―category‖ of policy instruments 
includes various types with contrasting characteristics, some of which are reported to match the 
characteristics of public subsidy programs [24]. This finding was further documented in [25], who 
made the point that many PES schemes could also be studied from the perspective of traditional public  
policies except for their underlying justification based on the remuneration of environmental services. 
Besides which, in many cases PES schemes tend to refer to the way that funding is secured for a given 
forest restoration initiative, notably through trust funds, rather than to the way that land users are 
involved through contracts [26]. Hence, we see that no black and white situation exists and the 
multidimensionality of all these policies and policy instruments tends to disqualify any attempts to 
make rigorous distinctions. 
We have attempted to bypass these methodological hurdles in two ways. First, by studying two 
cases that illustrate the other end of the spectrum from public and national restoration programs, in that 
they are local and privately funded. Second, by looking at both sides of the table, namely funding (how 
financial resources are collected) and incentive distribution (how financial resources are spent). These 
two sides are complementary and involve governance challenges of equal importance for success. 
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Funding determines the sustainability and scale of forest restoration efforts and can follow various 
paths from mandatory taxes to voluntary contributions; while incentive distribution determines the 
effectiveness of a scheme and can also take different forms, ranging from individually tailored contracts 
to flat subsidies. 
Another source of confusion is the role of public authorities in ―PES schemes‖. Clearly all depends 
on the scope of these policy instruments and what schemes this category encompasses. The evidence 
so far suggests that public authorities keep a firm grip and maintain a central role in many of the 
market-based instruments for environmental services, which runs counter to the common belief of a 
―rolling-back‖ of the state [27]. This fact also provides justification for our investigation and empirical 
documentation of the changes—if any—of governance induced by new mechanisms for forest 
restoration, which can certainly not be taken for granted. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we need to make one additional remark concerning the forest 
restoration activities that are studied in this article. While being justified by their positive contribution 
to water services, their actual effect on ground water is complex and controversial. The ―more trees 
more water‖ myth is discussed and challenged in the literature [28–32], yet some recognize that forest 
cover might have positive impacts on infiltration in smaller scale catchments [33] with steep [34] and 
degraded soils [31,33]. Examples of improved groundwater storage are indeed documented in tropical 
forests [31,35]. The scope of our article is limited to the governance of a few restoration activities that 
are assumed by stakeholders to provide water services; it does not include a discussion of the impacts 
of forest cover on water. We only observe that forest restoration activities are undertaken based on 
their assumed capacity to increase the availability of groundwater in the dry season, which is an 
assumption that runs counter to some evidence in the literature [29,31,32]. 
In order to assess the reality of institutional changes in PES-related restoration schemes, we 
undertook field research in two of Indonesia’s most prominent PES experiments, one in the Banten 
province west of Java (Cidanau) and the other in the island of Lombok in the eastern part of the 
country. The next section provides details about the chosen case studies and our analysis methods 
before presenting and discussing results. 
2. Case Studies and Methods 
2.1. Case Study Presentation 
2.1.1. Lombok: Three Successive Funding Arrangements with Water Users 
The first initiative is located on the island of Lombok in the eastern part of the archipelago and is 
one of the driest Indonesian islands. Its population is mainly concentrated in the lower plain where the 
capital city Mataram is located (see Figure 1), which has around 400,000 inhabitants. In the dry 
season, from March to October, there is little rainfall on the plain. The regional public water supply 
company (PDAM) therefore uses water catchments located at the bottom of the Rinjani volcano. These 
catchments play a key role in the regulation of water flows. However, a dramatic decrease in water 
flow from the springs was observed following the deforestation of the volcano’s slopes in the 1990s, 
with around 50% of the springs drying up in the Rinjani area between 1985 and 2006, according to the 
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Provincial environment agency (BLHP) [36]. Most stakeholders, both local and international, have 
assumed that these facts are related. 
Figure 1. Location of the two case studies (Indonesia). 
 
The whole process to develop a PES was initiated in 2001 with the financial and technical support 
of international agencies (US Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Ford Foundation) through the organization of workshops 
and economic valuations addressing environmental issues in the watershed. These early activities led 
to a first and short-lasting PES experiment set up by local NGOs (Konsepsi, WWF-NT) and PDAM in 
the mid-2000s. Following a willingness-to-pay study among Mataram residents, an intermediary body 
(Bestari Community Funds) was created to collect and manage voluntary financial contributions. 
However, transaction costs were too high relative to the amount of money collected and potential to 
make a difference on the ground. Indeed there was no certainty about the available budget based on 
voluntary (hence, unpredictable and subject to large fluctuations and decline) contributions that 
remained extremely limited but with constant fixed costs to organize the system. 
Since water tariffs are regulated by a regional decree, the district government had the opportunity to 
take control of the PES [37]. After a long legislative process, a new district regulation on 
―environmental services management‖ was issued in 2007, which paved the way for the establishment 
of a second PES from 2009 onwards. This second PES replaced the existing private intermediary body 
(Bestari Community Funds) with a sophisticated multi-stakeholder public agency (IMP). This new 
intermediary acted as fund manager, while implementing and controlling field operations, with the 
participation of civil society (WWF-NT, Konsepsi, etc.) and public agencies such as district 
authorities. The regulation established a monthly tax on water subscription that has been enforced 
since December 2009 and is collected through the PDAM billing system, and the funds have been used 
since 2010 by the IMP to cover expenses for forest restoration and local empowerment activities 
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proposed by farmer groups. Restoration activities consist of the distribution of seedlings to individual 
farmers, under the supervision of a farmer group (kelompok). 
Finally, a third PES scheme emerged in parallel after 2011, when the company PDAM (a major 
service beneficiary) decided to design and promote its own approach, probably because of the 
perceived ineffectiveness of the two previous attempts. This scheme involves bilateral agreements with 
farmers (without the multi-stakeholder agency IMP as intermediary) and takes place in parallel with 
the activities supported by the second scheme [37] (p. 272). Case selection is ultimately made by 
PDAM on the basis of proposals from the district forest service that in turn considers initial requests 
that originate in the farmer groups. While the funded activities (seedling distribution) that serve as 
incentives are very similar to the second and third schemes, the funding and coordination aspects are 
contrasting. Fee collection is clearly innovative in this third scheme. It relies on the ―cost recovery 
principle‖ to justify an internalization of the restoration costs as operational costs which are passed on 
to water consumers. Indeed, as opposed to the second scheme that exhibits features of a regional tax 
allocated to public activities through the district budget [38], [37] (p. 280), this third scheme has the 
company directly charge the costs of land rehabilitation to water users [37] (p. 272). 
2.1.2. Cidanau: Funding by a Private Water Company, Management of Incentives Agreements  
by Local Stakeholders 
The second case study is sited in the Banten province, which is located in the western part of the 
island of Java (see Map 1). The Cidanau river watershed covers 22,036 hectares and most of the land is 
privately owned, except for a few plantations that are managed by the parastatal company Perum 
Perhutani and the 2500 ha Rawa Danau National Reserve in the center. Local residents rely heavily on 
agricultural development and show interest in using forestry systems for fruit and timber [39]. While 
the causes of land degradation remain unclear, many acknowledge locally that there has been an 
increase in illegal farming and migration to the area after the 1998 economic crisis. Both the Rawa 
Danau National Reserve and the surrounding public forests are affected by this degradation [39]. 
Land degradation in the Cidanau watershed is thus a source of concern because of soil erosion and 
surface rainwater runoff. The Rawa Danau swamp area downstream faces eutrophication and 
sedimentation threats [40,41], and the water quality and average flow of the Cidanau river have 
decreased [41]. 
PT Krakatau Tirta Industry (KTI) collects water near the Cidanau river mouth. The water is then 
processed and distributed to a number of users including (i) the regional public water supply company 
PDAM (as in the Lombok case) and (ii) another 120 industrial users. While water supplies are 
currently sufficient to meet the needs of users, KTI staff expressed concerns about the future given that 
water demand is expected to steadily increase and the above-mentioned environmental problems could 
lead to a further decrease in water availability and quality, especially during dry seasons. For these 
reasons the state agency in charge of the watershed management (BPDAS) undertook forest restoration 
measures in the mid-1990s; in parallel, KTI has been distributing free seedlings to promote 
reforestation efforts in the watershed. 
However, according to concurring views gleaned from interviews with local key informants, such 
efforts have not met expectations because of poor coordination and unsatisfactory governance. 
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Therefore, in 1998 a broader group of stakeholders established the multi-stakeholder  
Cidanau Catchment Communication Forum (FKDC) that includes representatives from government 
agencies (Forest Office, Agriculture Office, provincial and district planning agencies and BPDAS), 
universities, upstream and downstream farmers, private companies (e.g., KTI), and NGOs (e.g., 
Rekonvasi Bhumi). In 2002, the Forum received legal recognition with a decree issued by the governor 
of the Banten province. 
The concept of downstream-upstream payments was first introduced to Cidanau stakeholders in 
2002 by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the national NGO LP3ES [42,43]. This move 
was part of a broader project to develop PES in several watersheds in Indonesia, under the 
coordination of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). While options 
were being considered in 2002, a member of the local NGO Rekonvasi Bhumi visited the renowned 
FONAFIFO Costa Rican PES scheme whereby landowners are paid for sustainably managing their 
land. During this visit, he understood that conditionality was a real innovation compared to land 
rehabilitation and reforestation programs in Indonesia, which explains its introduction to the Cidanau 
scheme. In 2004, the service beneficiary KTI agreed to participate in and fund a PES scheme using the 
services of FKDC as an intermediary. In principle, KTI would pay the FKDC to support forest 
management including forest restoration in the watershed, and FKDC would in turn contract with 
upland farmer groups to plant on their private lands. Payments on both sides—funding and incentive 
distribution—would be on the condition of satisfactory reports by a monitoring team. 
2.2. Methods 
This article is an institutional assessment of several PES schemes that are underway in Indonesia. In 
both case studies, fieldwork was undertaken by two economists and one political scientist during 2012 
and 2013. Research techniques included numerous in-depth semi-structured interviews in addition to 
the analysis of secondary data, from the reports of NGOs and other stakeholders to pieces of legislation 
and peer-reviewed articles. 
At the program level, we interviewed key informants from the main stakeholder institutions: 
government officials (e.g., the forestry department), intermediary organizations (the essential roles of 
which are described), companies as main service beneficiaries (water supplier or producer), and 
NGOs. These interviews led to the collection of data on institutional design and changes, and to the 
analysis of stakeholder motivations and PES rationale. 
At the village level, we interviewed farmer group leaders who were participating in one of the PES 
schemes under assessment. Their views provided us with relevant first-hand information about the 
governance of the schemes, their implementation in the field, and their evolution. Data were also 
collected at the farmer level with focus groups and individual interviews, giving us a comprehensive 
understanding of farmers’ views, the level of information-sharing, and their participation in  
decision-making processes. 
All three levels of observation combine to enable an assessment of the governance structures of two 
PES in Indonesia, with an analysis of the strategic relationships between the stakeholders involved in 
these schemes. It provides the framework for the discussion of our research question on institutional 
change and the effectiveness of new approaches to forest restoration. Collaboration was sought with 
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locally-active research institutions (Bogor Agricultural University, the World Agroforestry  
Center-ICRAF) and all information collected at different levels could be consistently triangulated with 
information collected at another level. 
3. Results: Institutional Analysis 
Results are presented for the two cases and insights are drawn from the data that relate to funding 
(particularly Lombok) and incentives (particularly Cidanau) so as to assess the situation from both 
sides of the PES table. This analysis provides the basis for the discussion section where information 
from both cases is combined to address the research question and the two assumptions. 
3.1. Lombok: An Intriguing Process of the Embedment and De-Embedment with Public Policies 
3.1.1. Embedment into Public Policies with the Enactment of a Regulation to Secure Funding 
The evolution of the Lombok scheme with its three consecutive PES versions is briefly described 
above. The latter two versions are taking place in parallel, if not in competition with one another. 
While such an approach may seem complicated at first glance (see Figure 2), an institutional analysis 
enables a better understanding from a governance point of view. 
Figure 2. Governance structure of the three PES in Lombok. Source: [44]. 
 
The substitution of PES 1 by PES 2 was clearly justified by the need to secure and enlarge the 
funding potential of the scheme, so as to increase its capacity to induce forest restoration with the 
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distribution of incentives to farmers. The first PES was initiated by private actors in collaboration with 
the main service beneficiary, namely PDAM, the public water supply company. In the Lombok 
context, economic studies of the willingness-to-pay and economic valuations of the environmental 
services appeared innovative, but the resulting impacts were fated to be anecdotal. The shift from 
private action to regulation was a consequence of the decision to rely on the PDAM billing system. 
Even if the willingness-to-pay was high, consumers did not pay spontaneously. It was thus logical to 
search for another way to collect financial resources. 
A legislative process was launched to endorse the new regional tax, as required by national fiscal 
regulation. It resulted in the establishment of a very limited tax per contributor that is added to monthly 
bills. The amount depends on the payer: 24,000 households pay USD 0.1 per month (the price of a 
cigarette), while business entities pay USD 0.2 per month and commercial water producers pay just 
USD 0.001 per cubic meter of water produced. These new contributions are minimal for each 
contributor but substantial overall. 
Due to the reluctance to pay a new tax in a context where contributors have doubts about the 
reliability of public authorities to manage the funds, it was decided to establish an intermediary body 
representing a majority of stakeholders. This multi-stakeholder agency (IMP) involves representatives 
of civil society and the public sector. This step arguably represented a great move towards 
participatory governance and enhanced transparency in decision-making, which increased the 
popularity of the scheme compared to previous land rehabilitation programs in the area. 
With the PES 2, based on a political consensus, 75% of collected funds were initially earmarked for 
PES field activities with the remaining 25% being attributed to the district budget to cover IMP’s 
operational costs. However, recent changes have led to the 75% being used to cover IMP’s costs as 
well, instead of the district budget (see Figure 2), hence reducing the funding available for field 
activities [37] (p. 270). This move shows less political will than expected in addressing the provision 
of water services with the PES. Despite a lack of publicly available data on money issues, we were told 
by IMP that IDR 100 million (USD 10,000) were spent annually in the field, an amount expected to 
increase in 2013. Over the first two years (2010–2011), 10 agreements materialized with farmer 
groups, but the contracts did not stipulate conditions on the provision of environmental services once 
restoration had been performed. Once funding had been received, farmers were free to manage their 
lands according to their own preferences, and this potentially includes logging the planted trees when 
mature. Legally, the agreements between IMP and farmer groups are more like legal formalities that 
are necessary in order to receive a public subsidy that is made on the basis of an administrative 
decision (unilateral), rather than genuinely negotiated bilateral contracts [37] (p. 271). 
This version of the Lombok scheme illustrates the capacity of local actors to engage in up-scaling 
of funding in order to seek greater impacts with forest restoration. A first and rather naive attempt with 
voluntary contributions from individual water users led to this refinement, which has characteristics 
that differ from the original PES concept where funders are free to participate. 
3.1.2. A Process of De-Embedment and Cost Internalization… to Enhance Effectiveness? 
The main beneficiary from forest restoration activities—the water supply company PDAM—was 
not entirely satisfied by this course of action and launched a third version of PES in 2011. Indeed, 
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effectiveness was anything but guaranteed with these lax contracts that imposed few, if any, strict 
conditions on farmers. The third version involves bilateral agreements between the service beneficiary 
and farmers. However, the district forest administration still intervenes in the management of the 
scheme on behalf of the PDAM (pre-selection of activities and follow-up of implementation), but 
contracts and payments directly link the farmer groups with the PDAM. This is an important 
distinction between PES 2 and PES 3; indeed in PES 2, PDAM is just one of the 16 IMP council 
members with limited influence on operations, while PDAM is the major actor in PES 3 [37] (p. 204). 
The second important difference is that conditions are associated with payments in PES 3: tree losses 
must be replaced at the cost of the farmer. Although payments are made before these conditions are 
actually verified, our interviews led us to the conclusion that farmers understood that credibility was at 
stake [37] (p. 276); however the real impacts of this fact have yet to be assessed and cannot be taken at 
face value. 
Our interviews revealed that the high transaction costs of the IMP-led scheme were part of the 
reason for its replacement, while PDAM sought to lighten the administrative burden, in other words, to 
reduce bureaucracy. Our interviews also found that PES 3 contracted farmer group leaders thought that 
procedures were much simpler than with PES 2. The agreement negotiation process is similar in the 
different PES schemes, but PES 3 follow-up requires less administration for the monitoring, reporting 
and verification stages [37] (p. 264). A second important point is that PDAM payments are much more 
generous than IMP ones. In 2011, PDAM disbursed around USD 65,000 (IDR 738 million) to  
10 farmer groups, while over the same period IMP distributed around USD 10,000. The larger scale of 
the PDAM scheme derives from the wider scope of its payment collection process. Indeed, to 
internalize the costs of water service provision, i.e., PES activities on the ground, the water company 
collects IDR 1,000 per month (USD 0.01) from all of its 75,000 subscribers in three districts (compared 
to the 24,000 households subject to the tax in the West Lombok district with PES 2). Farmers prefer to 
join the PDAM scheme (PES 3) when given the choice, even if the conditions are more restrictive. 
This competition between the two might explain why IMP is currently trying to move its scheme into 
new areas where agreements have not yet been signed with the PDAM. 
Based on the information collected from key informants, it appears that PDAM had a specific 
motivation for establishing a new and parallel scheme, specifically, to raise its profile and reputation. 
With the incorporation of forest restoration costs into the company accounts (PES 3), which are 
formally included in the water bill as part of water production costs, as opposed to a tax that is 
imposed by regulation and presented separately on the bill (PES 2), PDAM presents itself as  
a generous contributor with more attractive contracts for farmers, rather than as a tax collector [37]  
(p. 272). 
This third version consists legally of administrative contracts, a hybrid between a private 
transaction and a delegation of a public task. When PDAM negotiates a contract, it acts in a similar 
way to private actors, despite its public legal status. The legitimacy of such payments is based on the 
contribution provided to the public good and relies on a formal legal basis (although one which is 
largely ignored) stating that all Indonesian public water supply companies can include restoration 
activities in their operational costs [37] (p. 170). In contrast, PES 2 consists in the implementation of a 
public regulation (a perda, a regional law, enforced in a perbup, a district ordinance). Both are 
regulated by public law, but they fundamentally differ in nature. 
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As a conclusion and based on the explanations and details above, it appears that three types of 
contracts, regulating three distinct types of relationships, are used to conduct similar activities in the 
same area in a different institutional manner: private contracts in PES 1, implementation of a public 
regulation in PES 2 and administrative contracts in PES 3 [37] (p. 281). Therefore, from a governance 
point of view, we observe differences in terms of voluntary (private contracts) or mandatory (public 
regulation) financial contributions by service beneficiaries, and the role of public authorities in 
organizing and controlling the transactions (public regulation supervises tax collection with PES 2, but 
a parastatal company is in charge with PES 3). 
3.2. Cidanau: A New Governance without Guarantees of Improved Targeting and Decision-Making 
3.2.1. Farmer Groups and the Multi-Stakeholder Agency as Two Key Components of the Governance 
Structure 
This scheme involves two different contracts: the intermediary makes agreements with both the 
buyer of the service and its provider (see Figure 3). On one side, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) was signed in 2005 with the private water producer KTI (renewed in 2010) as the funder, 
leading to an annual payment of USD 350 per hectare per year for planted and/or conserved forest. 
Most MOU conditions were decided on by the technical team, which is composed of various 
stakeholders (KTI, district and provincial planning agencies, the Forest Department and Rekonvasi 
Bhumi) in consultation with farmers. Building on rules set in previous government land rehabilitation 
programs, it was decided that a minimum of 25 hectares of contiguous lands per farmer group would 
be necessary for inclusion. Decisions with respect to the number of trees per hectare (which was set at 
500) and the level of payment were also inspired by past practice in the national forest rehabilitation 
program (GERHAN), which was coordinated by the national government [45]. 
Figure 3. Governance structure of the PES in Cidanau. 
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On the other side, contracts were signed between the FKDC and farmer groups as providers for an 
equivalent period of five years, which included clauses on payment levels and related conditions, 
including the specification of eligible tree species. The FKDC initially wanted to pay USD 100 per 
hectare per year, i.e., a much lower sum than that requested by farmers (USD 250 per hectare per 
year), but negotiations resulted in a deal being struck at USD 125 per hectare per year (Personal 
Communication, Pak Hutang, January 10, 2013). Concerning tree species, farmers negotiated for a 
70:30 ratio of fruit to timber trees as sufficient for eligibility, contrary to rules commonly followed by 
past governmental programs. 
During the five-year period of the contract, a minimum of 500 trees per hectare must be maintained. 
The FKDC monitoring team is responsible for ensuring adherence to this stipulation. The team, which 
includes representatives from a number of stakeholders (e.g., the forest department and KTI), goes into 
the field once a year to monitor 2.5 hectares of randomly chosen land within each farmer group. Once 
approval has been given, payments are made to farmer group leaders, who in turn are responsible for 
the distribution of cash to individual participants. If the team submits a negative report, i.e., if it 
discovers that even one farmer failed to meet the conditions, then payments are terminated for the 
whole group. Since the beginning of the scheme’s implementation in 2005, two groups breached their 
contracts, while two others renewed theirs for a further five years, out of a total of eight farmer groups 
that have been involved at some point. 
3.2.2. Business as Usual? 
All interviews with key informants confirmed the widespread opinion that the FKDC technical team 
had a strong tendency to make contracts with farmer groups that it had prior experience working with 
in various other programs. Its choices were also influenced by the good organizational capacity that 
these farmer groups had demonstrated in the previous programs. Following on from this, the selection 
of individual owners and their land remains in the hands of the farmer group leader, so long as those 
selected meet the requirement of having at least 25 hectares of contiguous land. As a result of this 
tendency, much land where PES efforts are critically needed, for example land that is steeply sloping, 
has a high risk of soil erosion or low forest cover, may be excluded from the program; or if it is 
covered this could be merely coincidence. 
The fact that land selection is practically carried out on the basis of social criteria rather than 
scientific assessment is of critical importance. Indeed, one might question the relevance of PES-funded 
forest restoration if the provision of environmental services is not high on the agenda, which the 
analysis of the targeting process suggests. Another article [46] conducted an in-depth investigation into 
this hypothesis through an extensive survey with more than two-thirds of the scheme’s participants 
(270 interviewees out of 382 participants). The results showed that most of the land engaged in the 
program already had good forest cover prior to its enrollment, with almost three quarters of 
participants not requested to plant trees on their lands. Moreover, more than a third of participants 
described social motivations as the basis for their decision to enroll [46]. 
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3.2.3. Transparency and Decision-Making: Towards Real Innovation? 
Qualitative observations and key informant interviews tend to show that participating farmers have  
a limited understanding of the program and that farmer group leaders retain most of the information. 
This is a consequence of negotiating and managing contracts with groups as opposed to individuals.  
As stated by a high-level KTI staff member when asked about cash distribution and internal 
communication within the farmer groups, ―we do not want to look into their local politics‖ (interview 
with a KTI Director, Thursday, January 10, 2013). As a result, the amount of knowledge that circulates 
among participants largely depends on the desire and capacity of group leaders to disseminate 
information within the group. 
We noticed that participants had a good knowledge of the rules in general, although only a few 
could quote all of them. For instance they were well-aware of the requirement to have more than 500 
trees per hectare on their lands to receive funding, but a majority failed to mention the requirement that 
all lands had to be contiguous over 25 hectares. In fact, it appeared that the role of the farmer group 
leader was perceived as central, with many respondents declaring to be ―actually selected by the 
farmer group leader‖. This could mean that local leaders involved in this PES were somehow playing 
the role of ―regulator‖, whereas these instruments are presented as market-oriented, as opposed to 
national public programs where public authorities are expected to regulate. 
Another critical observation in the field was that participants only had a limited knowledge of the 
financial amounts that they should receive in the near and mid-term future, and the schedule for these 
payments, assuming that they met the contractual conditions. This finding was confirmed by [46] who 
reported that a large majority of households did not know the payment schedule or the amount that 
they would receive for their next payment. These results point to a lack of transparency and the limited 
dissemination of information about the PES scheme. 
Other observations could also be interpreted as support for the view that the amount of information 
given to participants is far from satisfactory and the decision-making processes remain opaque. Indeed, 
the farmer group leader was named by a large majority of participants in response to questions about 
the persons in charge of determining rules and payments. It is striking that other stakeholders with a 
strong involvement in contract design were almost completely forgotten: the intermediary FKDC, the 
water supply company KTI, and representatives from Rekonvasi Bhumi. Moreover, only a handful of 
participants saw themselves as having a voice in the negotiations about rules and payments, whereas 
PES are presented as innovative policy instruments that make negotiation and participation a priority. 
4. Discussion: Do PES Improve the Governance of Forest Restoration? 
Our objective is not to position large-scale governmental programs and PES as opposite ends of a 
scale of policy instruments for forest restoration; rather we find a continuum of situations in practice. 
Policy instruments are multi-dimensional: governmental programs can deliver incentives while PES 
can be designed and implemented by governments. Nonetheless, as a starting point for our analysis, we 
used the reported weaknesses in terms of governance of traditional public programs for forest 
restoration in Asia-Pacific [16]. 
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Therefore, instead of comparing two large groups of policy instruments that are artificially 
separated from one another along the lines of public, traditional and large-scale versus private, 
innovative and local, our study looks at the governance implications of PES through the investigation of 
two assumptions. The first is that multi-stakeholder agencies as PES intermediaries represent an 
institutional innovation, positioned between the collection of funds and the distribution of incentives 
(as opposed to top-down land rehabilitation programs); while the second assumption is that specific 
individual (or collective) results-oriented contracts with associated conditions attached to payments (as 
opposed to corporate subsidies or daily salaries) are essential to the success of PES programs. 
4.1. First Assumption: PES Intermediaries Represent an Institutional Innovation 
Regarding the first assumption, a key governance feature that is present in both Indonesian PES 
cases is the creation and influential role of a multi-stakeholder agency, which has responsibility for the 
management of the distribution of incentives among service providers. However, there are striking 
differences between the two cases. In Lombok, the multi-stakeholder agency was presented as a means 
to make the tax more palatable to water users in a context where there is mistrust in the government’s 
ability to manage public money. This was the main justification for the creation of the scheme, along 
with good prospects for a high standard of fund management. However, it appeared that the forest 
agency benefited from the uneven distribution of power among stakeholders, and was in a position to 
promote its own priorities using PES financial resources in a context of low budgets allocated to forest 
agencies. As a consequence, the water distribution company decided to create a parallel scheme that 
would put environmental services at the center again. By taking this step, the water company no doubt 
intended to raise its profile and reputation as well as to challenge the power of the forest agency,  
in addition to addressing other factors such as the high transaction costs. 
The non-linear process is the crux of the matter and the most interesting part of the story: early 
embedment of the PES into public policies with a reliance on regulation to set a specific tax on water 
users with the creation of the multi-stakeholder agency; followed by a de-embedment, through the 
creation of a financing mechanism that is fully integrated into the business model of the water  
supply company. This de-embedment process is expected to strengthen the effectiveness of financial 
expenditure for the purposes of service provision, or at least address cost-effectiveness issues. Indeed, 
some observations indicated that fund management by the existing multi-stakeholder agency (PES 2) 
had weaknesses: the number of contracts finalized so far is limited, and the agency recently decided to 
allocate to the district budget the share of the collected taxes previously earmarked for covering the 
implementation costs. It might indicate the temptation of embezzlement that arises in certain contexts 
when public administrations take the lead, which is precisely the reason why new PES-like 
experiments are highly praised, as opposed to more traditional governmental programs. Therefore, in 
this particular case study, the creation of a multi-stakeholder agency might not be a guarantee for  
better governance. 
The situation in Cidanau tells us a different story; here the multi-stakeholder agency remains the 
principal and widely recognized actor in the area. The agency is also seemingly dominated by one 
stakeholder from civil society which has a great influence owing to its past accomplishments. Yet 
another important layer exists at the interface between the agency and individual farmers, namely the 
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farmer group leaders, and it was this layer that was a focus of our study in Cidanau. Our field 
observations showed that these farmer group leaders played a vital role in the scheme, a finding that 
was confirmed by the two instances of breach of contract, both of which could have been avoided with 
appropriate action on their side. The problem is that there is much variability in the management 
abilities among the farmer group leaders. Governance in the Cidanau situation depends a great deal on 
the capacities of these farmer group leaders, and the intermediary agency neither guarantees good 
governance nor has a negative impact in this regard. On the whole, the internal governance of the 
farmer groups appears to be decisive for the sustainable effectiveness of forest restoration efforts. 
Another key observation is the inability of this governance structure to ensure the satisfactory 
targeting of lands for restoration. Having a multi-stakeholder set up provides no guarantee that 
participants will be identified and selected in a neutral way and that decisions will be based only on 
scientific information with regard to the provision of environmental services. Social connections were 
favored as a criterion for farmer enrollment (and hence land selection), which in our opinion 
constitutes a weakness of the scheme as it puts effectiveness at risk. In other words, land with the 
highest potential contribution to environmental services provision is probably not more likely than 
other land to be earmarked for forest restoration. This result is consistent with other empirical cases of 
small-scale watershed projects. In Central America, it was demonstrated that the choice of PES 
participants results from a complex social process rather than a rational technical assessment [47]. 
These authors conclude that payments only provide complementary ―support‖ for activities that 
farmers would have carried out for social and cultural reasons. In Peru and Ecuador, it was contended 
that better spatial targeting could be achieved in two watersheds in order to include genuinely critical 
areas [48]. 
At a larger scale, our finding also complements the aforementioned observation that large-scale 
governmental forest restoration programs in Asia-Pacific have sometimes resulted in forest conversion 
prior to planting [16], which is another hazardous method of land targeting from the perspective of  
forest restoration. 
4.2. Second Assumption: Results-Oriented Contracts Are an Essential Aspect of PES 
Regarding the second assumption under investigation, the results-oriented conditions that constitute  
a key feature of PES as a new approach to forest restoration are not particularly strong. While their full 
impact remains to be demonstrated, the two case studies examined here provide lessons that differ 
from our assumption. In Lombok, few (if any) PES 2 conditions are enforced, and it is not yet clear 
whether PES 3 will be any better at putting pressure on farmers to carry out effective land-use changes. 
Besides which, the contracts are at an early stage and cannot compete with larger scale intensive 
reforestation programs financed by regional and provincial forest administrations. That said, the three 
successive versions of the scheme are assumed to have the potential to eventually tackle causes of 
deforestation owing to their capacity to change local perceptions and habits. They rely on the active 
participation of farmers to make proposals and are not perceived as top-down public policies; as a 
consequence, they are thought to have an indirect leverage effect that may exceed the direct  
corrective effort of more ―traditional‖ restoration programs. The latter usually involves the payment of 
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salaries to local laborers who are hired to plant trees but have little stake in their maintenance in 
subsequent years. 
In Cidanau, these conditions are more stringent, which is demonstrated by the fact that 
infringements led to the breaching of two contracts. The credibility of the threat to withhold payments 
is also a central element of PES governance and one that is seen as a step towards greater effectiveness 
compared to traditional governmental programs because it generates better results than salaries paid to 
locals in return for daily labor, or the opaque distribution of subsidies to well-connected corporations. 
In this regard, despite many examples of individuals having a poor understanding of these conditions 
and their implications for future payments, we could indeed observe a certain level of achievement. 
Yet we also observed a tendency to enroll farmers who might not have dramatically changed their 
business-as-usual activities, which means limited additionality and a low level of threat with the 
conditions. In addition, farmer group leaders have a certain amount of latitude to prevent the breaching 
of contracts when conditions are not met. 
Overall, the two sites exhibit the same characteristic that is detrimental to effectiveness: most 
stakeholders have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the scheme, whatever its level of success in 
terms of sustaining the provision of environmental services. In other words, NGOs, local authorities, 
research institutions, and even private companies—as service beneficiaries when they use funds from 
Corporate Social Responsibility budgets—prefer to avoid apparent failure at any cost. In practical 
terms, failure is understood as the cessation of payments rather than a lack of service provision, which 
is clearly a controversial view. The problem is that, regardless of the degree of stringency for 
conditions, effectiveness is eliminated whenever additionality is absent or the targeting of service 
providers is irrelevant. Therefore, a ―winning‖ strategy (for a number of stakeholders but certainly not 
from an environmental point of view) would be for payers and intermediaries to demonstrate that 
strong conditions are attached to sustained payments, while at the same time involving the most easily 
targetable service providers. This typically implies that farmers do not attempt to change their 
activities and there is no guarantee that the right farmers are brought on board. 
5. Conclusions 
This article discusses the capacity of innovative policy instruments such as PES to improve the 
governance of forest restoration activities compared to more traditional large-scale governmental 
programs. To do so, two assumptions were investigated, the first regarding the establishment of  
multi-stakeholder agencies as intermediaries and fund managers; and the other concerning the 
inclusion of conditions in the contracts with service providers. Both of these assumptions are believed 
to enhance forest restoration efforts. 
An initial finding was that intermediary bodies are certainly not sufficient to guarantee success. As 
shown in different ways by the two cases under investigation, outcomes were greatly dependent on the 
internal governance of these bodies. While virtually all local stakeholders were represented, in each 
case we found that about one was able to dominate the decision-making process: the forest agency in 
Lombok and a local NGO in Cidanau. Interestingly, the main service beneficiaries in each case study 
adopted opposite strategies in reaction to this domination by another actor: the public water company 
in Lombok moved on and created its own scheme, whereas the private water company in Cidanau 
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decided to keep the ball rolling, its expectations being little more than the nurturing of its image. The 
situation in Cidanau might however deserve a more positive appraisal given that the local NGO 
involved understands the difficulty in achieving a high degree of effectiveness but is making 
incremental changes towards improvement. For instance, the somewhat shaky governance of many of 
the farmer groups is identified as one area of reform for the future. Reforms are probably more 
difficult to undertake in Lombok where the intermediary body is de facto controlled by local 
administrations. It remains to be seen whether stakeholders can improve the scheme based on its 
existing format, instead of creating an alternative, as PDAM has done. 
A second conclusion is that even when conditions exist, they do not guarantee success. Not only 
because they can be applied to the wrong participants in the sense that their business-as-usual activities 
remain unchanged, but also because there is a common interest among many stakeholders to keep the 
schemes alive and visible. Since the service beneficiaries do not have any alternative options, they 
must find ways to ensure that forest restoration takes place on the ground, even if it means ignoring 
(temporary) failures when the wrong plots are targeted and there is no additionality. In this context, 
conditions can be seen as a means to raise awareness among service providers and to increase the 
chances of success in future rounds. Another interpretation would be that conditions are designed in 
response to local capacities and not the other way around; in other words these conditions would 
encourage rather than strictly regulate service providers. 
Although our results reveal the limited effectiveness of the schemes that aim at promoting forest 
restoration despite innovations in their governance owing to PES schemes, either because the scale is 
too small, additionality is not proven or targeting is flawed, our overall conclusion is that local 
stakeholders have a great ability to adapt and make progress. In both case studies, processes were 
initiated by international actors eager to replicate the PES model as conceptualized in foreign 
institutions: the London-based IIED coordinated the project in Cidanau in the early stages, and 
international organizations such as the Ford Foundation, USAID and UNDP were influential at the 
very beginning of the process in Lombok. Yet directions have largely diverged over time, and it is 
undeniable that a sense of ownership has developed among local stakeholders. While one case 
exhibited a very dynamic evolution with three successive versions of PES and an unstable reliance on 
regulation and public policies (Lombok), the other example has proven to be more resilient in design 
with a classical ―private beneficiary-intermediary-land users‖ set up (Cidanau). This finding is 
interesting because both schemes were influenced by the international discourse advocating new ways 
to foster good forest management, and both schemes addressed the same water services in a same 
country. Therefore, having such diversity in terms of governance is a key issue: rules, modalities of 
intermediation and participation, fund collection, conditions, and payments, are all elements that 
differed in order to adapt to the local context. 
Ultimately, and despite the limited scale of forest restoration activities and a lack of evidence for 
the effectiveness of these PES schemes with respect to service provision, we find optimism in the 
future possibilities for these new ways to govern forest restoration in a developing country context. 
Lessons from past failures in governmental programs—or at least assumed failures—are in the minds 
of local proponents of innovations in governance for forest restoration initiatives. Innovations can 
deliver and yield positive results, despite resistance from local administrations or state agencies that 
are used to taking advantage of opportunities for embezzlement and thus want these opportunities to 
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continue. Yet these public actors will remain indispensable for the provision of these public goods, and 
it might prove to be more productive to find enabling conditions for their positive participation, rather 
than just trying to bypass them. 
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